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truth of religion, Mr. Fiske suggests a striking and original argument. Life consists, in Mr. Spencer's phrase, in the adjustment of inner relations to outer relations. The eye is formed in response to the stimulus of rays of light, the ear to the excitation of vibrations of air, maternal love is called forth by the helplessness of infancy. Now, in analogy with this, the author argues, there must have been something objectively real to produce the religious beliefs of humanity. "If the relation thus established . . . between the human soul and a world invisible and immaterial is a relation of which only the subjective term is real and the objective term is non-existent, then I say it is something utterly without precedent in the whole history of creation (p. 189). This argument evidently proves too much; there is nothing to prevent its being applied to any belief whatsoever. The religious conceptions of mankind certainly had some cause, arose in response to some external conditions. But whether those objective conditions are rightly interpreted by the religious postulates here enumerated, or are even partially and inadequately stated by them, we cannot say.

J. E. C.

Philosophy of Theism. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1894-96. By ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER. Second edition, amended. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons; New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.—pp. xviii, 338.

The appearance of a new and revised edition of these lectures affords the opportunity of recalling attention to their importance as among the best products of the Gifford Lectureship. After the full reviews which the two successive volumes of the work in its original form received in this REVIEW (Vol. V, pp. 406 ff.; Vol. VI, pp. 176 ff.), it is only necessary now to note the changes which the author has introduced into this edition. In the first place, the original two volumes are now condensed into one, a change which, with the corresponding reduction in price, brings the book within reach of a larger circle of readers, and ought to prove especially serviceable in promoting its use as a text-book for students. But, with characteristic care and industry, Professor Fraser has availed himself of the opportunity of a new edition to recast and to a great extent rewrite, the book. The new arrangement of the argument in three parts is particularly useful. These parts are entitled respectively: Part i, "Untheistic Speculation and Final Scepticism"; Part ii, "Final Reason in Theistic Faith"; Part iii, "The Great Enigma of Theistic Faith." "The five lectures in the First Part deal with three forms of speculation, each of which would reduce the universe of reality to One Substance or Power." These are Universal Materialism, Panegoism and Pantheism; and the author represents total Scepticism as the *reductio ad absurdum* of all these alike, "when those

Monist speculations are pressed intrepidly into their issues." Following this critical and negative discussion, the positive and constructive argument for Theism is developed in Part ii. Here the theistic conception is presented, "not as a direct consequence of deductive or inductive proof, but as founded on our spontaneous moral faith in Omnipotent Goodness at the heart of the whole, taken as an inevitable (conscious or unconscious) presupposition in all human experience—the reconciling principle in our intercourse, scientific or moral, with the Power that is universally at work." Part iii is concerned with "the Great Enigma of Evil, presented at least on our planet, which seems to contradict the fundamental moral faith, and, by disturbing the religious or optimist conception of existence, to lead to pessimist scepticism. That it is impossible for an *unomniscient* intelligence to demonstrate the supposed contradiction, and thus transform our universe into an untrustworthy universe, with which one can have no intercourse, is the attitude primarily assumed towards this Enigma. But further considerations are proposed by which the difficulty seems to be mitigated even to human apprehension, pointing to modes of escape from the dismal alternative of a scepticism which would involve Science and Goodness in a common ruin." The chief of these considerations is "the fact that the universe, or at least this planet, seems to be adapted to the progressive improvement of persons who have made themselves bad, suggesting that a slow personal struggle towards the Ideal, rather than original and constant perfection of persons, may be implied in finite personal agency."

The author's general standpoint may best be described, like the argument itself, in his own words. "The philosophy initiated in these lectures may perhaps be called either Humanized Idealism or Spiritualized Naturalism. It seems to be the reasonable attitude toward his own life and the universe for a person like man, who is confined by his small share of experience to a knowledge which—real as far as it goes—is intermediate between Unconscious Nescience and Divine Ommiscience."

The sentences quoted are taken from the important new preface to the second edition. The careful reader will find throughout the book abundant evidence of the seriousness and wisdom of the revision to which it has been subjected, and will be impressed anew with the originality, the insight, the present seasonableness, and the permanent value of the entire discussion

J. S.

Versuch einer philosophischen Selektionstheorie. VON DR. JOHANNES UNBEHAUN. Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1896.—pp. 150.

After examining the scientific accounts of natural selection, the author proceeds to find the element which is common to the different forms which the principle assumes in its different applications. Having reached in this manner the kernel of the matter, he believes that he is in a position to develop a complete theory of selection in a purely deductive way without any empirical aid. He insists, moreover, that this procedure is the only